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The paper presents the results of 2-year survey conducted in 2011-2012 among Russian universities and 
companies who jointly implement R&D projects aimed at development of high-tech manufacturing. The joint 
projects represent a new government instrument to stimulate the development of linkages between universities 
and companies by giving matching grants for R&D to companies with obligation to order R&D to a university-
partner. 
The objectives of the survey included analysis of motivation for cooperation both from side of universities and 
companies; primary effects and side-effects of such initiative; changes that may be introduced to the government 
regulations concerning matching grants. 
Total 38 teams were surveyed. Our findings show that major motivations from side of universities were access to 
new practical research tasks from companies, selection of most competitive teams of researchers capable to 
work with companies, and strengthening reputation in business environment. Companies were interested in 
getting government funding in order to solve their technological problems; to strengthen, due cooperation with 
universities, their research capacity, and to use modern research infrastructure located at universities. 
The analysis allowed identification of the major effects of the matching grants mechanism. They included: 
strengthening of university orientation towards solving practical tasks which are of interest to business; 
institutionalization of relations between universities and business in the sphere of innovation activity; broadening 
of research cooperation and the formation of research consortiums; harmonization of research and educational 
tasks in universities, and orientation of the parties towards continuing cooperation in the innovation sphere. 
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1. Theoretical Framework for R&D Subsidies 
In past decades radical changes in conditions for innovative activity have occurred all over the world. 
Governments substantially transformed their approach to innovations . With globalization and growing 
international competition, policy towards innovations has shifted from being neutral to more proactive, in the form 
of direct state stimulation of the innovation processes.  
There is a wide variety of instruments in support of innovations that have been applied in various countries. 
These include tax exemptions, target credits, state subsidies, etc. Subsidies to companies for R&D occupy a 
special place in the list of instruments.  
At the beginning of 1990s,  the neo-classical  theory of growth was widened in a number of research papers (see 
Romer, 1990; Segerstrom et al., 1990; Grossman, Helpman, 1991; Aghion, Howitt, 1992), illustrating the fact that  
subsidies for R&D  stimulate companies to channel more resources for research and development, resulting in a 
positive effect on economic growth. Later, a number of theoretical models were developed (see Howitt, 1999; 
Segerstrom, 2000) to evaluate long-term effect of subsidies on R&D for economic growth.  
Teubal (1996, 2002) pointed out that the successful penetration and dissemination of R&D in the new industrial 
countries was based on intensive  group training (“learning by others”) and multi-discipline training with the 
positive results of such learning  cumulative through time. Exactly neutral and wide support of R&D at its initial 
stages makes it possible in the future to identify  real market slumps on the basis of sector specifics and to switch 
to a more selective policy to stimulate innovations.  
Within the framework of the evolution approach Bach and Mats (2005) believe that learning failures are basic and 
interpret them as a limit or constrain to the use of the cognitive capacity of agents and groups of agents. In this 
connection they draw attention to such problems as lack of coordination between agents, poor development of 
institutions for the joint development and dissemination of  knowledge. This also includes  poor tuning and de-
synchronization  of institutional changes with the current technological changes, codification complexity (lack of 
standards and platforms), barriers to absorption, etc. It is also noted that support for corporate R&D should be 
treated, on the one hand, as a mechanism mitigating risks and sharing expenditures, while on the other as a 
method for developing network interaction and the creation of new collective knowledge.  
Since the middle of the 1990s, the practice of public subsidies to companies for R&D began to spread out to the 
new industrial countries and then to the developed countries.  During the last two decades, R&D subsidies to 
companies  remain an important  instrument of state innovation policy of the EU countries, Israel, and the USA.  
To a substantial degree this provided a broad basis for empirical studies of effects of R&D subsidies on 
companies and also for comparing the results of this instrument with other measures to stimulate innovations. 
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2. Effects of Public Subsidies for R&D on Companies: Evidence from Abroad 
The effectiveness and results of various instruments for support of R&D investments is one of the key questions 
in government innovation policy, particularly in the situation of growing  budget limitations that is under way in 
many countries.  
 Data for EU countries show that in comparison with   tax exemptions public financing of R&D at business sector 
results in more long-term effects (Guellec, y Van Pottlesberghe, 2003). The advantage of R&D subsidies is also 
associated with their potential for companies to “compensate” market uncertainty. This was empirically confirmed 
by  Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) on the basis of data for production firms in Germany. Therefore if tax exemptions 
promote primarily the expansion of existing innovation projects, subsidies are directed at the launching new and 
more long-term projects. Berube and Mohnen (2007) pointed out that the firms receiving grants are more often 
innovators of an international level and are more successful  in commercialization as compared with recipients of  
only tax exemptions. 
Public financing for R&D in business sector accompanied by co-financing is often called “matching grants”. 
Matching grants have other advantages in comparison with other financial instruments to support R&D at 
companies.  They are extremely important for startups and for firms that have launched innovation programs 
(Hall, Maffioli, 2008). These grants lower the start barrier, promote cooperation and simplify access to outside 
knowledge. 
Hall and Maffioli (2008) systematized the results of evaluation of grant programs in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Panama and noted that in all these countries there were visible positive effects in raising innovation activity of 
companies, in particular in boosting corporate expenses on R&D.  The participation of firms in these programs 
also stimulated positive behavioral changes – a much more active approach by the owners of these firms to 
innovations and broadening of foreign cooperation. However with regards to improvement of outcome indicators, 
the results were much more modest. The authors pointed out that possibly this were due to the short period of 
time. Nevertheless, no statistically reliable empirical data were obtained to testify any positive impact on the 
number of patents or the volume of sales of new products. With regards to improvement of the overall company 
competitiveness indicators – such as larger market share, higher productivity – they turned to be indefinite. From 
one hand there was a positive correlation with the company growth, but from the other - no tangible improvement 
in productivity.  
With the widening practice of R&D subsidies to companies, including those based on “inter-country transfer” and 
accumulating of subsequent experience, there were identified new problems and risks associated with the 
application of such instruments. A number of researchers – David, Hall, Toole, 2000; Klette, Moen, Griliches, 
2000 pointed out that the effectiveness of public support of R&D in a company could stimulate rent seekers 
behavior among economic agents with the possible substitution of  public funds by private resources.  In the 
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course of analysis of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program effectiveness, Wallsten (2000) 
discovered a similar substitution effect (it was more evident with the growing number of company personnel). 
Wallsten noted that the low demonstrative  impact of subsidies may limit the multiplicative effect of  spent 
resources.  
One of the issues discussed was the influence of subsidies on boosting company innovation activities (growing 
investments in R&D). But that not always leads to improving of company end results, such as volume of sales of 
new products, its market share, and labour productivity. It was assumed, for instance, that additional company 
resources could be used to raise wages of researchers without any changes in the end result of their activity 
(David et al. , 2000). Besides, Catozzella and Vivarelli (2011) have discovered that with state support R&D 
expenditures of the companies are higher, however the effectiveness of these expenses is lower (with regards to 
product innovations).  
The effects from R&D subsidies to companies are being actively discussed  in Latin America, the newly 
industrialized countries, and the EU countries --Germany, Belgium, Italy, Finland, Austria  (see, e.g.: Aerts, 
Czarnitzki, 2004; Czarnitzki, Hussinger, 2004; Czarnitzki, Licht, 2006; Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Takalo et al.,2008; 
Wanzenbock et al., 2011; Czarnitzki, Bento, 2011). 
The systematic study conducted by Guellec and v Van  Pottlesberghe (2003) occupies a special place in 
research aimed at  evaluating the influence of R&D  subsidies on companies in EU countries. The study 
examined the effect of state financing of company R&D expenses in 17 EU countries for the 20-year period. The 
researchers also discovered a positive influence of subsidies on  R&D  financing from side of business.  It was 
noted that target programs for financing companies’ R&D ensured better perception and the use by these 
companies of knowledge generated by the universities.  
Cerulli and Poti (2010) examined the effects of subsidies on Italian firms and found out their overall positive 
influence – both at the stage of increasing R&D financing and the end result – in form of growing number of 
patents. According to their assessments due to subsidies the additional growth of expenditures on R&D was 40% 
while the number of patents increased by 3.5%. Meanwhile, the authors identified substantial differences between 
the two groups of firms: the first group demonstrated positive changes while the second one  was associated with 
the substitution of  state resources for private finances. The first group was moiré oriented on obtaining patents 
and increasing its fixed capital. This group included a big number of large firms but at the same time it shared 
features of the second group in terms of R&D intensity, structure of expenses, and other indicators of corporate 
finances. The authors concluded that such results may be explained by two factors. First, larger firms are able to 
rely on the size effect, namely, they have larger potential for specialization, for entry into networks, for absorption 
of outside knowledge, for acquiring credits. Second, larger firms have more extended planning horizon, their 
strategy  is more oriented  at long-term capitalization. Small Italian firms constitute the traditional family property 
model combined with the fear to lose strategic control; finally, their owners give priority to current earnings.  
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Priority in research was given not that much to numerical effects of company activities, as to changes in their 
behavioral pattern with regard to innovations. On the basis of studies of 1,200 Austrian firms conducted in 2003, 
Falk (2006) undertook an integrated analysis of effects with emphasis on changes in their behavior. It was noted 
that large firms demonstrate more often positive changes in their behavior. With continued support there is 
greater probability for such changes due to their cumulative nature. Wanzenbock, Scherngell, Manfred (2011), 
studied the activities of 155 firms in Austria and received somewhat different results related to the nature of firms 
that are ready for a change.  The conclusion is as follows: young, small, and technologically specialized firms are 
much more ready to change their behavior than companies with larger resources for R&D.  In this, authors’ 
conclusions are close to those made by Hall and Maffioli (2008).  
In terms of assessing possible  demonstration effects it is important to note that in his studies Falk (2006) 
identified some positive effects already at the stage when firm applies for subsidy (even if later the application is 
rejected). For some firms the very participation in the competition serves as additional motivation to pay more 
attention to relevant issues.  
The highly original study conducted by Aschhoff  (2009) deserve special mentioning. It was based on data 
covering German firms during the period from 1994 to 2006 and was assessing the influence of grants on support 
of research projects at companies (DPF grants - Direct R&D Project Funding grants). It was shown that the effect 
of subsidies depends on their size – small grants are less effective. The conclusion was also made that 
companies with a history of state support (grant recipients) are more inclined to increase their private investments 
in R&D. However there were no tangible signs that firms with regular public support are less efficient. Aschhoff 
assumed that this may be associated with the planning effect, i.e. firms may take risk while being aware (based 
on its previous experience) that the support will be provided later on.  
Clarysse, Wright, Mustar (2009)  studied the factors which determine the essence of  behavioral patterns on the 
basis  of  a poll survey of 194 companies that had received subsidies within the framework of the IVVT program 
(Belgium, 2001-2004) and 84 companies of the control group (that conduct innovation activity but did not received 
subsidies). The result underlined the importance of the learning effects and identified the fact that  inter-
organizational   interaction stimulated  behavioral changes. At the same time the authors have discovered that the 
learning effect becomes less important  with the growing number  of  projects implementedby the company with  
the support from the federal budget. This somewhat contradicts to the conclusions of other experts who generally 
positively assessed the influence of repeated support procedures (Falk, 2006; Aschhoff, 2009). 
Overall, matching grants are being considered by experts of international development institutions (Goldberg et 
al.,2011) as one of the best practices  in government innovation policy which deserves special attention and 
dissemination in countries with an underdeveloped innovation system.  
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Experts and consultants express mostly positive attitude towards R&D subsidies to companies, based on the 
results of numerous studies. At the same time it is pretty uncertain that this given instrument is “universally 
positive. On the basis of research papers presented in review on the subject of  subsidies and their impact on 
corporate R&D (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2012) it appears that out of the 76 empirical micro-level studies 48 cases 
confirmed  the hypothesis  about attracting additional resources for R&D. But in 15 cases there were effects of 
substitution of public funds by private investments. In 13 cases there were no clear effects. If one takes in 
consideration not only micro-level studies but also research based on sectors and branches of industry, then 71 
studies confirm positive effect of R&D expenses, 23 studies identify  the substitution effect, and 24 studies show 
no effect at all. Thus one may see a broad range of studies which have failed to identify even such a basic effect 
of R&D subsidies as growing private R&D expenses.  
Most likely, these results are highly dependent on local conditions in each country concerned, on the exact design 
of a mechanism to subsidize corporate R&D. Problems regarding methodology  of assessment of state support  
effects remain serious. Therefore many aspects related to influence of matching grants require additional deep 
studies.  
3. Mechanism of Matching Grants in Russia 
During the last 5-7 years Russian innovation policy was developing rather rapidly. During the period of 2006 – 
2008, with Russia’s growing government resources, the goal was set to move towards innovation path of 
development.  Judging from the actual measures undertaken, there was an attempt to stimulate in industry 
demand for innovations. At that time a number of important  tax exemption acts were adopted for business, major 
financial development institutions were set up, and  active steps taken to “build up” the innovation infrastructure 
(see, eg.: Zasimova et al., 2008; Dezhina, 2011; Simachev et al., 2012). 
During the acute phase of the crisis (2008 – 2009), the task of stimulating innovation lost its priority and the 
budget allocations plus individual instruments of the innovation policy were partly “retargeted” to compensate 
losses caused by the crisis (Simachev et al., 2009). However, simultaneously federal level “re-evaluation” of the 
role of innovations in terms of  ensuring competitiveness of Russian economy was undertaken. As a result the 
goal of modernization has been finally rooted as one of the main declared government priorities.  
Starting from the second half of 2009, there was a re-activation  of the innovation policy and not only within earlier 
implemented directions (tax stimulation of innovation, building  up of the system of financial development 
institutions ) but also aimed at initiation of basically new measures (the Skolkovo innovation city, technological 
platforms, “push to innovations” applied to major state-owned companies, and the  mechanism of matching 
grants). A specific feature of the Russian innovation policy during the post-crisis period was the growing attention 
to cooperation among the major actors of the innovation process, the development of networks and partnerships 
within the innovation sphere, and stimulation of research activity within universities.  
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However the overall situation in innovation sphere may be characterized as not very optimistic in terms of pace of 
R&D activity in business sector and “connectivity” among actors in innovations system (tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1 
Selected Indicators of Innovative Activity in Russia, 2006-2011 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Intramural expenditures on R&D, in % to GDP  1.07 1.12 1.04 1.25 1.16 1.12 
Allocations on civilian R&D from the federal budget, in % to 
GDP 
0.36 0.40 0.39 0.56 0.53 0.58 
Government expenditures in the total on R&D, % 61.1 62.6 64.7 66.5 70.3 67.1 
Business enterprise expenditures in the total on R&D, % 28.8 29.4 28.7 26.6 25.5 27.7 
Share of organizations that conduct technological 
innovations, in % to the total number of organizations* 
9.4 9.4 9.6 9.4 9.3 9.6 
Share of expenditures on technological innovations in % to 
the total volume of goods produced, works conducted, 
services implemented* 
1.4 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.5 1.5 
*) Resource extracting, Дmanufacturing, electric power, gas and water production and dissemination 
plants  
Sources: HSE. (2012). Science and Technology Indicators in the Russian Federation. Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow; HSE. (2012). Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation. Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow. Data for 2011: http://expert.ru/2012/12/10/tochka-kipeniya/?ny  
Table 2 
Indicators of the Level of Development of Innovation System, on Scale from 1 to 7, according to 
Knowledge Economy Index, World Bank (data for 2010) 
 
Indicator USA UK Germany France Japan China Russia 
Level of private 
sector expenditures 
on R&D 




5.8 5.6 5.2 4.0 4.9 4.6 3.7 
Level of protection of 
intellectual property 
rights 
5.1 5.3 5.7 5.9 5.2 4.0 3.0 
Availability of 
venture capital 
3.8 3.0 2.8 3.2 2.8 3.3 2.3 
Development of 
value chains 
5.1 5.5 6.3 5.7 6.3 4.0 2.6 
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page3.asp  
Instrument of matching grants became one of the government measures aimed at bridging the gap between 
supply and demand for innovations and to boost private investments in innovations. On April 9, 2010, the 
Government of the Russian Federation adopted decree # 218 “On measures of state support for developing 
cooperation between Russian institutions of higher education and the organizations that implement integrated 
projects aimed at  creating high technology production”. This decree identified the mechanism of competition-
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based subsidies on R&D with the aim of financing integrated projects conducted by production enterprises and 
higher education institutes (universities) in order to organize high tech production.  
The Russian mechanism of matching grants may be characterized by the following parameters: 
• A competition based  support from the federal budget – subsidy recipients are selected on the basis of 
an open competition; 
• The commercial nature of projects - realization of an integrated project aimed at creating a high tech 
production is supported; 
• Support of partnerships and stimulating demand of companies on R&D. The project is carried out jointly 
by the company and university. The recipient of the subsidy is the production enterprise which uses the 
funds to finance R&D conducted by the university within the framework of  the joint project; 
• A substantial research component in the project. The subsidy is provided  for a period of one to three 
years in the amount of 100 million rubles (approximately 3.3 million USD) annually to finance R&D 
conducted by the Russian higher education institute; 
• Co-financing and distribution of risks. The production enterprise should invest into the project amount of 
money equal to at least 100% of the subsidy. The organization of a new  high tech  production facility is 
financed from own company’s resources and at least 20% co-financing shall be used for R&D; 
• Expected duration of the project and its monitoring. The production enterprise shall provide information 
on high tech products developed under the project during at least 5 years after the closure of the subsidy 
contract. 
By December 1, 2012, a total of 95 companies and 87 higher education institutes participated in projects aimed at 
creating of high tech production.  
The mechanism for providing subsidies under Government decree # 218 is the first instrument in Russia 
conceptually similar to the “matching grants” mechanism implemented in a number of countries. Although there 
are many basic similarities with foreign practice, some insignificant specifics of the Russian mechanism with 
regard to “matching grants” may be identified, such as: 
• Only higher education institutes are allowed to be R&D partners for business in order to obtain 
government subsidies; 
• There is no emphasis on support of private companies’ projects; 
• Absence of provision to support consortia of enterprises; 
• No regular (permanent) procedure for the receipt, evaluation, and support  of joint projects by business 
and universities; 
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• There are a number of barriers for participation of small and rapidly growing companies in the 
partnerships. 
Although “matching grants” usually constitute a mechanism aimed at stimulating business demand for innovation 
and R&D, in case of Russia it has developed to a considerable extent into an instrument encouraging universities 
to cooperate with business. In fact, this mechanism is seen by the government as a method of “teaching” and 
adapting universities to understand the R&D demand from side of business.  
4. Methodology and Basic Hypotheses  
The research results presented in this paper are based on informal problem-focused interviews with 
representatives of companies and universities implementing joint projects on the basis of matching grants. 
The use of  company and university representatives as initial data sources seems very important when the accent 
is given to evaluation of behavioral changes. First, in such case there is less probability to face to cautious 
respondent since behavioral additionality is outside of the sphere of officially monitored results. Second, 
behavioral effects are basically descriptive. So the use of close-ended questions and a formalized questionnaires 
will not be beneficial. Behavioral additionalities are poorly digitalized  and require  qualitative evaluations.  
The preliminary results of the study are based on the analyses of interviews conducted in 2011-2012 -- 38 
detailed interviews covering 28 projects  which received federal support in 2010 within the mechanism of 
matching grants (27 interviews with representatives of 15 institutes and 11 interviews with representatives of 8 
companies). 
The main directions of the study nts were based on the following questions:  
1. How did the “design” (the normative framework) of matching grants mechanism  affect the composition  
of participants in the project ? Who was the main initiator to apply for subsidy?  
2. What were the main initial motivations of the parties (the universities and companies) to participate in a 
project based on matching grants mechanism?   
3. How the importance of various problems has changed in the course of project implementation? Which 
problems are temporary and which are of long-term nature?  
4. What are the main effects (both positive and negative)  of participation  in projects ? What are the 
lessons learned by the participants and how do they assess the prospects for further cooperation ?  
5. What can be done in order to improve the matching grants mechanism and to increase its efficiency?   
The following preliminary assumptions were made for further study and clarification: 
1. Universities are primary initiators to apply for subsidy since they are interested in receiving budget 
financing. Business is mostly interested in the engineering services provided by the universities. 
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2. In the course of the project implementation there will be both positive and negative behavioral effects 
within the companies and the universities involved in the project. The strongest conflict generating factor 
with substantial behavioral additionalities is the transition of control over the research results from the 
government to the company-recipient of the subsidy.  
3. The interaction between universities and companies  in the course of projects implementation will reveal 
many aspects due to mutual influence of scientific and educational processes. The subsidies will   have 
a most substantial effect on the universities since they are better prepared to accumulate and 
disseminate the results. 
5. The Results of the Analysis 
5.1. Motivations of Companies and Universities 
The analysis of responses to direct and indirect questions about the stimulus for participation in the competition 
for matching grants reveals a broad spectrum of reasons, both from universities and  the companies.  
From side of universities four major reasons should be mentioned. 
First - most of university representatives  pointed out  that  this is the first measure due to which the university 
could receive substantial resources for realization of a major research project with serious results. Despite the 
fact that many universities have sufficient financial resources they are nevertheless limited financially in 
conducting R&D.  
The second important aspect was receiving practical tasks from business, identifying necessary directions for the 
development of research and engineering competences, the selection of the most competitive research groups. 
The representatives of a number of universities also pointed out that participation in such projects strengthened 
reputation of the university among potential business clients.   
Third – the projects were seen as a measure to establish or restore cooperation with business. 
Fourth – considerable number of university representatives see the  matching grants mechanism as a method to 
support for their research activities, so they are viewed as one of the opportunities to acquire federal support for 
university development.  
As far as companies motivations are concerned, they are, according to our assessments,  associated with the 
following factors.  Due to the fact that most companies are not ready  to invest into R&D, particularly at the pre-
competitive stage, they  are more interested in dealing with  technological and engineering tasks  when it comes 
to identifying the content of the project.  
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A successfully developing company is mainly motivated by the perspective to acquire new technology which 
would increase company’s competitiveness, broaden the volume of sales and will allow entering new markets.   
Smaller companies are highly motivated by prospects to strengthen their human capital due to cooperation. In 
addition, for business it is important to use modern technological equipment within the framework of the project. 
In a number of universities in recent years there were major improvements made in their technological and testing 
facilities.  
According to our observations small companies were highly motivated by the prospects to get additional 
resources for their innovation activity, while it was not a major factor for big enterprises.  
5.2. Effects of Matching Grants Mechanism  
We do not examine here direct effects which are associated with the project goals (e.g. growing R&D expenses 
by companies, additional volumes of innovation product, etc.). We believe it is more important to evaluate the 
external, institutional effects brought by the matching grants mechanism.  
The positive effect of matching grants associated with the orientation of universities on R&D demand from 
business has been cited by many university representatives at various levels of authority. For university 
presidents this is an important factor from the point of view of market demand for university services. It also 
means diversification of institutional activity and for the university researchers - an opportunity to be involved in 
implementation of practical tasks. The real interest displayed by business in a number of projects may be 
considered as one of the major result of matching grants mechanism. 
Here are some quotations derived from interviews with university representatives:  
“… I see a sincere interest of company when I communicate with businessmen. I feel whether people have 
genuine interest or not. In one project this interest is pronounced – these people have shining eyes and they want 
to know what the university can do for them within the framework of the project”; 
“…. They  got more deeply involved in the projects which promise real product. This entails greater responsibility  
and higher quality … This confirms that working for the sake of making a product requires special responsibility. 
There should be high standards set for the project implementation.” 
Participation in joint projects also allowed universities to identify the most productive researchers. In a number of 
cases these were companies who selected university researchers for the joint project and thus matching grants 
mechanism  gave an opportunity to support the best university specialists.  
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Some cases show that matching grants opened the way to institutionalizing partner relations between universities 
and business. In one of the interviews a university representative pointed out that in the past the partner 
companies who needed a specific work to be done preferred to sign contracts directly with the researchers. This 
form of relations inevitably resulted in conflict of interests. The realization of projects stimulated the formation of 
joint research groups, enriching their potentials. 
“Does the university structure allow realization of this project? It does, because the partner university constitutes 
a conglomerate of its research department and the company. Accordingly, there is no shortage of personnel.  If 
the project would involve only university researchers, then the deficit of the personnel would occur since there 
would be no engineers and designers involved in the project. They are all in the company-recipient of the 
subsidy”. 
An important effect is that matching grants contributed to sustainability of new research groups that were formed 
for project implementation: “One of the ultimate tasks following the completion of the project is to retain some kind 
of professional group”, “we would like these ties to develop into some kind of laboratory that would be capable to 
perform  interesting research tasks”, “ since this is a real project we see a personnel mix and the involvement of 
young specialists”, “there came forth the idea of setting up a center of competence”.  
In the course of their contacts with universities, some of the companies activated their interaction with other 
higher education institutes as well.  In a number of cases the practical tasks of the projects could not be 
implemented only by the partner universities. This was the prerequisite for expanding the number of project 
participants and the formation of research consortiums – “An important result was that in the course of the project 
implementation the company-recipient of the subsidy  created a network of partner universities.  Since this is a 
principally new task it turned out that it was necessary to recruit specialists from various institutes all over the 
country. The partner university did not have all the required specialists”. 
The realization of a number of projects stimulated harmonization and enrichment  of research and educational 
activity: at first, several projects  were initiated by companies which personnel used to graduate from the partner 
university. Later, the university was able to attract students to research activities within the framework of the 
project with the ultimate goal of problem-oriented development of their competence and further employment at 
the partner company. 
“A positive factor for the university - additional financing which helps to develop R&D, allows setting tasks to 
graduate and MA degree students. Later, these researchers will be able to get a job at the enterprise”. 
“What do we expect within the next 2-3 years? The launching of a technological line at the plant which will be the 
source of further activity for university (training of students and promotion of R&D, adaptation of production)”. 
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Companies also demonstrated interest in the development of lecture courses for students and even in working 
out new directions for their training. “University science suffers from huge financial limitations. The Government 
fails to resolve this problem and no one knows what is to be taught and what will be the cost of such education. 
For this very reason the company-recipient of subsidy thinks over starting a lecture course on logics at the 
physics faculty of the partner university”. 
In conclusion it may be pointed out that most of respondents positively assessed the mechanism of matching 
grants. They stated that this instrument stimulated interaction between universities and companies. Direct 
contacts with business are much more interesting and productive for future development. This may be considered 
as one of the most important positive effects. Of no less importance  is the fact that the matching grants  
encouraged universities to deal with industry and  drew attention of business to possible partnership with 
universities both in research and teaching.  
6. Discussion and suggestions 
On the basis of analysis the following major effects of the matching grants mechanism may be identified:  
- Strengthening of university orientation towards solving  practical tasks which are of interest to business ; 
- institutionalization of relations between universities and business in R&D; 
- broadening of  research cooperation and in some cases - formation of consortiums ; 
- harmonization  of research and educational tasks ; 
- orientation of the parties towards continuation of cooperation in the innovation sphere. 
It may be concluded that in the course of matching grants mechanism application, companies and universities are 
in a “positive conflict” with each other. Overall we see positive attitude to cooperation both from side of companies 
and universities. At the same time some of the following problems may become sharper: 
- Distribution of intellectual property rights and its commercialization; 
- Co-ordination of interests within the universities regarding planning R&D and commercialization of 
research results. 
The matching grants mechanism turned to be more important for the development of applied and engineering 
skills at the universities. Application of the instrument stimulated demand on R&D from the companies and it 
should inspire business to invest more in R&D.  
In order to achieve that, it is important to accentuate the inter-relation and mutual consolidation of various 
instruments directed at the development of linkages between universities and companies, at the development of 
university infrastructure, and commercialization of R&D results.  
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The mechanism of matching grants will be more effective if to ease participation of small and rapidly growing 
companies. It would be worthwhile to examine the possibility of creation of companies’ consortia under matching 
grants. Such consortia may be established, for example, in innovative clusters.  
So far this instrument is intended for a demonstration effect. In order to ensure stable and positive developments 
within the innovation sphere it should be applied during a longer period of time. Therefore it is important to 
stimulate the “transition” of this instrument  to the category of permanent measures of government support of 
innovation activity.  It is essential to examine the possibility  of  applying the mechanism of matching grants tby 
various government financial institutes for development  in order to implement a continuous cycle of search, 
evaluation, and selection of innovative projects.  
Last but not the least, matching grants mechanism is extremely valuable for its indirect, accompanying effects. 
Evaluation of the results of its implementation should take into account this factor and include measuring 
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